Essays in Directed Technical Change by Cragun, Randy
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Dissertations Dissertations
5-2016
Essays in Directed Technical Change
Randy Cragun
Clemson University, rscragun@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cragun, Randy, "Essays in Directed Technical Change" (2016). All Dissertations. 1634.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1634
ESSAYS IN DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE
A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Economics
by
Randy Cragun
May 2016
Accepted by:
Dr. Robert Tamura, Committee Co-Chair
Dr. Michal Jerzmanowski, Committee Co-Chair
Dr. Scott Baier
Dr. Curtis Simon
Abstract
This dissertation takes the position that a scientific theory ought to be general and parsi-
monious and apply this rule to Daron Acemoglu’s theory of directed technical change to show that
the theory provides useful structure for our knowledge of human capital and wages.
The first chapter estimates the shape of labor demand and the strength of technical bias
by age group in the US while taking account of changes in directed technology that shift relative
demand for worker age groups. The data are consistent with demand shifts produced from the
theory of directed technical change when the elasticity of substitution between worker age groups in
the United States is slightly above 2, the threshold for strong technical bias. Instrumenting for labor
supplies with lagged populations gives similar results. The report illustrates how ignoring technical
bias can produce higher estimates seen in past work.
The second chapter proposes a new macroeconomic mechanism for generating concavity in
age-earnings profiles based on directed technical change. The mechanism does not depend on changes
in the human capital of the individual as proposed by Ben-Porath and Mincer; rather changes in
the relative human capital of age groups affect the profitability of age-specific technologies, biasing
innovation toward improving the productivity of younger workers. Using new data, I estimate that
on average a worker at the beginning of the career can expect a yearly wage increase of 6.2% while
a worker at the end of a career with 40 years of experience can can expect a yearly wage increase of
2.1%. The theory generates maximal earnings at a later age than observed by some past work with
macroeconomic data but is consistent with some micro estimates. The theory should be taken as
supplemental to—rather than replacing—human capital-based theories of age-earnings profiles.
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Chapter 1
The age structure of wages:
On the importance of technical
bias in estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between worker age
groups
1.1 Introduction
This chapter presents estimates for elasticities of substitution between workers by age group
in the United States. I improve on past work by considering the role of directed technology in
generating shocks to the relative demand for workers, by incorporating an instrument for labor
supply by age group, and by reconciling multiple estimates.
1
1.1.1 Directed Technical Change
Daron Acemoglu’s (1998; 2002; 2003; 2007) theory of directed technical change (DTC) posits
an explanation for historically observed skill premia by showing that innovators have an incentive
to direct their efforts toward technologies that complement inputs that are relatively abundant.
“Technologies” here means ways of organizing inputs that expand the production set. This paper
applies the theory to differences in wages between workers based on another characteristic of workers:
age.
In the theory, technology is input-specific and the relative returns to development of new
technologies for particular inputs depend positively on the prices of the products of that input
and on the abundance of that input (because higher factor abundance allows the innovator to take
advantage of low marginal costs of reproducing known technologies). Note that these two effects
are negatively related along a given demand function for the input: if firms rent more of the input,
its marginal product will fall. On the other hand, the mechanism of central importance for the
directed technology literature is that innovation shifts the demand curve for the input; when an
input is relatively more abundant, innovators have more incentive to develop technology for that
input because the market for their innovations is larger, and when they do create new technologies
this will improve the productivity of the input, which will increase demand for the input. Thus the
story is that an increase in supply of an input first reduces wages and then induces innovation, which
increases demand and wages. Figure 1.1 illustrates this theory.
To my knowledge, the extant research in this DTC field has focused solely on labor dif-
ferentiated by skill level (college education, etc.). However, there is nothing in the theory that is
inherently specific to explaining the wages of skilled and less-skilled workers rather than other classes
of workers or even other productive inputs. I propose that if we are to take the theory seriously, it
must be true that technical development follows productive input abundance for diverse classes of
inputs. This observation follows the well-known standard for any good scientific theory: it ought
to be general and parsimonious. I apply the theory to wage and labor supply data by age and skill
group to provide estimates for elasticities of substitution between worker groups.
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of directed technical change
Note: An increase in relative factor supply increases the market size for technologies that complement that
factor. These new technologies increase demand for the factor, potentially increasing its wage.
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1.1.2 The estimation problem
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between worker groups are concerned with mea-
suring the shape of the demand curve in Figure 1.1 by employing (hopefully) exogenous shifts in
relative supply (usually they are assumed to be random). Unfortunately for these estimates, shifts
in relative factor demand from increased relative technology will bias these results upward so long
as wages do not increase from the new technology and could create a positive relationship between
prices and quantities if the increase in technology is large, indicating to the casual statistician that
the elasticity of substitution is negative.
1.1.3 Card and Lemieux’s solution
This section presents a quick discussion of the methodology used by Card and Lemieux
(2001), which is similar to the one used by Murphy and Welch (1992). They propose considering
changes in the college wage premium partially as a result of imperfect substitutability between age
groups of workers.
They suggest thinking of high-school-educated labor and college-educated labor supplied as
CES aggregates of labor supplied by different age groups at those schooling levels:
Ht =
∑
j
(
αjH
σa−1
σ1
jt
)
σ1
σa−1
(1.1)
Ct =
∑
j
(
βjC
σa−1
σ1
jt
)
σ1
σa−1
(1.2)
where Hjt is high-shool-educated labor supplied by age group j in time t, Cjt is college-educated
labor supplied by age group j in time t, αj and βj age-group-specific productivity (technology)
parameters, and σa is the elasticity of substitution between age groups at the same education level.
They then use a standard approach (e.g. Murphy and Welch (1992)) and think of aggregate
output as a CES aggregate of the high shool and college labor indexes:
yt =
(
θhtH
σe−1
σe
t + θctC
σe−1
σe
t
) σe
σe−1
(1.3)
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where θht and θct are productivity (technology) parameters and sigmae is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between workers by schooling group.
Optimization in these markets leads to relative demand wages that depend on the relative
labor supplied and the productivity parameters:
ln
(
wcjt
whjt
)
= ln
(
θct
θht
)
+ ln
(
βj
αj
)
+
[
1
σa
− 1
σe
]
ln
(
Ct
Ht
)
− 1
σa
ln
(
Cjt
Hjt
)
+ jt (1.4)
They suggest that to estimate σa we can regress the college wage gaps (the left-hand-side
of Equation 1.4) on relative college-educated labor of that age group with age group and year fixed
effects to capture the productivity parameters and the relative aggregate college labor supplied
term. This approach is reasonable given their model, but if there is age-group-specific technological
innovation, then αj and βj should also change over time. In this case, the fixed effects will not
capture the relevant variation, and the estimates of σa will be biased.
This paper will show that the directed technical change framework suggests that if workers
of different ages are imperfect substitutes (the central claim of Card and Lemieux, 2001), then there
will be age-group-specific innovation. I propose an alternative estimation method that accounts for
this innovation.
1.2 Model of directed technical change using age groups and
human capital
Here I set up a dynamic model of a macroeconomy that follows closely with Acemoglu
(2002) except that I use the total human capital provided to the market by a given age group as
a productive input rather than using the quantity of labor supplied by people of different levels
of human capital. This would cause only negligible differences in solving the model (but not in
applications to the data) if we were to simply exchange the two values wherever they occur (we
could just stick an H wherever he has an L). However, because we cannot observe wages per unit of
human capital, I solve the model for the wage per unit of labor. Thus the factor wages that concern
us are not equivalent to those used by Acemoglu (in terms of their role in determining technology).
This specification is almost the same as used in Chapter 2.
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1.2.1 Final Goods
Aggregate output Y is produced competitively with intermediate goods Ya specific to age
groups indexed by a according to
Y =
[∑
Y
−1

a
] 
−1
(1.5)
1.2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced competitively using machines κa, labor La, and human
capital ha that are specific to the intermediate good:
Ya =
1
1− β (haLa)
β
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx (1.6)
In this particular application, the labor types are age groups, so readers can think of these interme-
diate goods industries indexed by a as composite sets of services offered to the market by workers of
different ages. There is a continuum of length Xa of machine types indexed by x, representing the
level of technology in age group (sector) a1, Ya sells at price Pa, machines of type x can be rented
at the price pa (x), and workers of age group a get paid wage wa.
1.2.3 Demand for factors
The monopolist with the blueprint for a given line of machine produces and maintains each
unit of the machine with a unit of capital2 rented at price R. Thus the stock of capital is always equal
to the stock of machines. Each monopolist has a competitor who can produce the same machine at
cost υR, so the monopolist sets the limit price pa (x) = υR. Assuming that first order conditions
hold with equality, the profit maximization condition for demand for a machine line for age group a
for a given capital rental rate is
κa (x) =
(
Pa
υR
) 1
β
haLa (1.7)
which is independent of the type x of machine.
1This differs from the treatment of technology by Card and Lemieux (2001), who treat technology as independent
schooling-group-specific and age-group-specific parameters. Their specification allows year and age group fixed effects
to capture these technology differences. Here technology is complementary to a measure of total human capital by
age groups.
2This is like assuming that one unit of capital can produce one unit of machine per unit of time and then machines
depreciate fully but capital does not. The reader can think of machines as capital that has been temporarily repurposed
for a specific method of production.
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Profit maximization in machines and intermediate goods gives a specification for demand
wages conditional on technology:
wa
wb
=
(
Xaha
Xbhb
)σ−1
σ
(
La
Lb
)− 1σ
(1.8)
where σ = 1 + (− 1)β is the elasticity of substitution between worker age groups conditional on
fixed technology.
We could stop here if technology were observable, but one of the points of this paper is to
discuss the impact on estimates of σ from not observing X and failing to understand that implicit
in wage and labor supply data are changes in technology.
1.2.4 Technological innovation
I assume that a country builds its own stock of technology with R&D expenditures (foregone
consumption) with the following innovation possibilities frontier:
X˙a = ηaR&Da (1.9)
where
∑
aR&Da = R&D and ηa determines age-specific productivity of innovation. This follows
the “lab equipment” model (Romer, 1987; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991).
Along the balanced growth path (BGP), free entry into the innovation sector gives us the
relative technologies:
Xa
Xb
=
(
haLa
hbLb
)σ−1(
ηa
ηb
)σ
(1.10)
This gives us the endogenous technology values to put into Equation 1.8 to get the long-run
relationship between wages and labor supplies:
wa
wb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)σ−1(
ha
hb
)σ−1(
La
Lb
)σ−2
(1.11)
1.3 The trouble with ignoring age-specific technical change
Equations 1.11 and 1.8 highlight the difficulty of estimating the relevant demand elasticities.
I have recreated them below to help illustrate the problem.
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wa
wb
=
(
Xa
Xb
)σ−1
σ
(
ha
hb
)σ−1
σ
(
La
Lb
)− 1σ
(1.8 revisited)
wa
wb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)σ−1(
ha
hb
)σ−1(
La
Lb
)σ−2
(1.11 revisited)
Linear regressions of the logs of relative wages on the logs of relative labor supply, as in
Card and Lemieux (2001), would produce coefficients whose meaning is ambiguous. Suppose the
regression coefficient is γ. If the time frame for the data is so short that technology has not had
a chance to adjust to a supply shock, then transforming γ into σ as in Equation 1.8 (σ = − 1γ )
would be justified. However, if technology has been able to adjust close to the BGP, we would want
to transform γ into σ as implied by Equation 1.11 (σ = γ + 2). This is not a minor difference.
As illustrated in figure 1.1, the shift in relative factor demand from increased relative technology
could create a positively-sloped relationship between prices and quantities, indicating to the casual
statistician that the elasticity of substitution is negative.
Consider the results of misunderstanding the data in this way. Figure 1.2 plots point esti-
mates for σ that we would get from various plausible regression coefficients using either the method-
ology from C&L or incorporating endogenous directed technology. The C&L estimates are unstable
near the threshold for strong technical bias (where the coefficient is zero ad my methodology gives
σ = 2) even if the coefficient is estimated precisely. Estimates by Card and Lemieux (2001) fall
within the highlighted box, corresponding to an actual elasticity of substitution slightly below 2 if
they did not properly account for technology changes in their data. I will shortly produce similar
estimates and demonstrate the volatility near σ = 2 by producing hugely negative and positive
values from only slight changes in the sample years.
Card and Lemieux (2001) would possibly argue that their estimation method might capture
changing technologies. They estimate models with time fixed effects to capture changes in relative
productivities of worker groups (here called “technologies”). However, as they point out, “the
relative supplies of different age groups are not all trending at the same rate”; this will necessarily
induce technology changes that are not captured by the time trends that they use if the directed
technology theory is applicable.
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Figure 1.2: Estimates of σ derived by C&L’s methodology and my methodology
Note: Estimates by Card and Lemieux (2001) lie within the highlighted box
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1.4 Regression model and assumptions
To identify the regression models, I follow Murphy and Welch (1992), Card and Lemieux
(2001), and Jerzmanowski and Tamura (2015) and think of the sector productivity of innovation
parameters (η) as being captured by a full set of age group indicators and a full set of year indicators
3:
(σ − 1) ln ηat
η25t
= αa + δt + ξat (1.12)
where ξ has conditional mean zero and I have indicated that the base category is age 20–24 with
subscript 20. Taking the log of Equation 1.11 and adding time subscripts gives us the following
regression equation:
ln
(
wat
w25t
)
= (σ − 1) ln
(
hat
h25t
)
+ (σ − 2) ln
(
Lat
L25t
)
+ αa + δt + ξa,t (1.13)
The reader should note the implied restriction on the coefficients on labor supplied and human
capital.
1.5 Instrument for supply shifts
Estimating these demand models is problematic, because it requires assuming that fluctu-
ations in the relative human capital and labor supplies are exogenous. Contrarily, they are likely
sometimes responses to the relative wages. Because higher relative wages should drive up relative
labor supply, a simple fit of these demand functions to the data will overestimate the relevant coef-
ficients. In order to limit this endogeneity problem, I propose using relative age-group population
sizes to instrument for supply shifts. It seems unlikely that population measures would respond
much to wages. Potentially, populations could change because of
• Migration: this is probably the most serious threat to the validity of the instrument, and I
will look at how much fluctuation there is in immigration and emigration by age group
• Death: poorer workers may be more likely to die
3Alternative specifications with linear and quadratic time trends produce almost identical results.
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• Measurement error: work choices could influence the likelihood that a worker would be counted
by population surveys
1.6 Data
1.6.1 US wages and labor supplies
I construct wages and labor supplied for individuals and age groups (25–29, 30–34, 35–
39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, and 60–64) in the United States using wage micro data from the
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from
the US Census from 1972 to 2015 (Ruggles et al., 2010) 4. The CPS sample provides three useful
measures for this purpose:
• The person’s wage and salary income earned over the previous year
• The number of weeks a person worked in the previous year (intervalled before 1976)
• The number of hours a person who worked in the previous year typically worked per week
(only available from 1976 on)
I attempt to add up all hours of civilian labor supplied by people aged 25 to 64. I multiply
the number of weeks worked last year by the usual hours worked per week to get the hours of labor
supplied by each individual5. In calculating the totals by age group, I multiply the individual hours
supplied by weights from the CPS that indicate how many people at the national level the sampled
individual represents.
For wage estimates, I use only white, male workers in the labor force who were full time
workers in the previous year6. I construct each worker’s weekly wage by dividing their income earned
from wages and salaries over the last year by the number of weeks the person worked over the last
year. I then construct an hourly wage by dividing this by the usual hours worked7 per week in the
4I use only the 5/8 sample for 2014
5Every year by age group cell contains more than 2000 non-institutionalized workers.
6With nine age groups per year, this gives a minimum cell size (in terms of number of non-institutionalized workers
in the sample) of 241, while approximately 90% of the cells contain over 1000 workers and most cells contain more
than 3000 workers.
7One problem with this method is that these “usual” values reported by the ASEC are likely not algebraic means.
Hopefully this measurement error is common across individuals and age groups and does not impact relative hours.
11
25−29
30−34
35−39 40−44
15
20
25
30
35
40
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
To
ta
l h
ou
rs
 o
f l
ab
or
 s
up
pl
ie
d 
(bi
llio
ns
)
Figure 1.3: Total hours of labor supplied by each age group (younger workers)
last year. The mean values for wages within age groups are weighted means of these hourly wages,
where the weights are provided by the CPS. Wages are deflated by the GDP deflator8.
The wage and salary data are top-coded, and the strategy for dealing with top-codes changed
significantly over the sample period. I use a set of corrected wage and salary data distributed by
the Census Bureau (acquired through IPUMS) that apply the 2012 rank proximity swap rule to
top-coded incomes in all years from 1975 on.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the total hours of labor supplied by age group (split up by the
younger and older groups on separate graphs) and Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the average hourly wage
by age group. The baby boom is clearly visible in the labor supplied graphs, and as others have
pointed out (again Murphy and Welch, 1992 and Card and Lemieux, 2001), this set of demographic
changes had a big impact on “the structure of wages” (Murphy and Welch, 1992). The instrument
for labor supply this report employs (lagged population) has the benefit of capturing changes due
to these demographic shifts.
8Others (e.g. Murphy and Welch (1990), Murphy and Welch (1992), or Card and Lemieux (2001)) use the CPI,
but since this report is interested primarily in the shape of the demand curve and the strength of incentives for firms
to innovate rather than in explaining workers’ wages, the deflator seems more appropriate.
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Figure 1.4: Total hours of labor supplied by each age group (older workers)
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Figure 1.5: Average hourly wage of each age group (younger workers)
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Figure 1.6: Average hourly wage of each age group (older workers)
1.6.2 Population
I construct the measures of population by age group from the CPS (ASEC) by adding up
the weights for all non-institutionalized persons. The population values are lagged by one year.
Thus the relative population measure for 35–39-year-olds would be the population aged 34–38 one
year earlier divided by the population aged 25–29 one year earlier (since I take 25–29 as the base
category in all regressions).
1.6.3 Human capital
I construct data on human capital following the methodology from Tamura, Dwyer, Dev-
ereux and Baier (2015) (TDDB), who borrow their measure of the returns to experience from macro
estimates from Bils and Klenow (1996, 2000), Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997), and Hall and
Jones (1999a) and their measure of returns to schooling from Banerjee and Duflo (1995). The human
capital of person i in age group a in year t is
hait = exp
(
SCHOOLait
10
+ .0495EXPERIENCEait − .0495
67
EXPERIENCE2ait
)
(1.14)
14
25−29
30−34
35−39
40−44
6
7
8
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Av
e
ra
ge
 h
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l
45−49
50−54 55−59
60−64
8
9
10
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Av
e
ra
ge
 h
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l
Figure 1.7: Average human capital of each age group
where SCHOOL is the number of years of school the person completed and EXPERIENCE is a
measure of years of work experience, equal to max {0, AGEait − SCHOOLait − 5}.
In order to calculate average human capital by age groups, I use the same sample of workers
that were used for the average wage calculations: white, male workers in the labor force who were
full time workers in the previous year. Figure 1.7 shows the average human capital of each age group
over time. The differences between age groups (driven mainly by higher age producing higher implied
experience) dominate the differences within age groups over time for younger workers. Older workers
are further in their careers, so the negative quadratic term in experience has a greater influence on
them and makes the relative human capital levels between age groups of older workers closer to 1.
Figure 1.8 illustrates this wage plateau for the older workers by plotting human capital for each
birth cohort throughout its life.
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Figure 1.8: Average human capital. Each line is a birth cohort.
1.7 OLS estimates of σ
There are nine age groups for labor, so there will be eight separate age-specific intercepts
and time trends. I take 20–24 as the base category in all regressions and indicate this group with
the subscript “20”.
Table 1.1 presents estimates of the restricted model in 1.13. At the bottom of the table, I
present the estimates for σ from transforming the coefficients. Column 1 presents OLS estimates of
the restricted model and suggests an elasticity of substitution a little above 2. In this specification,
unlike in Card and Lemieux (2001), increasing labor supply is associated with rising relative wages
(true when the coefficient on relative human capital is greater than one or the coefficient on relative
labor supplied is greater than zero). Although the coefficient estimate I get is close to theirs, the
point estimate I calculate for sigma with their methodology (−36.60) is far from their estimates
(typically less than 10 and greater than 4) and not even the expected sign. I remind the reader that
this instability occurs because they transform the coefficient on labor supplied into the elasticity
with the relationship COEFFICIENT = − 1σ .
In order to test the restriction on the coefficients on relative labor supply and relative
average human capital, Column 2 of Table 1.1 presents the unrestricted regression estimates of 1.13.
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Table 1.1: Least squares estimates of σ
OLS IV
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: ln
(
wat
w20t
)
ln
(
Lat
L20t
)
ln
(
wat
w20t
)
Restricted Restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln
(
popat
pop20t
)
1.112
(0.0195)
ln
(
hat
h20t
)
1.028 1.142 0.538 1.034 1.124
(0.0126) (0.0701) (0.1267) (0.0120) (0.0715)
ln
(
Lat
L20t
)
0.028 0.017 0.034 0.026
(0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0120) (0.0130)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360
Age group FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.858 0.859 0.972
σh 2.028 2.142 2.034 2.124
σL 2.028 2.017 2.034 2.026
C&L σh -35.97 -7.05 -29.57 -8.05
C&L σL -35.97 -57.95 -29.57 -38.64
90% CI for diff btwn h and L coefs (0.999, 1.241) (0.972, 1.220)
95% CI for diff btwn h and L coefs (0.973, 1.264) (0.948, 1.241)
99% CI for diff btwn h and L coefs (0.925, 1.308) (0.890, 1.290)
– Standard errors are in parentheses and are boostrap estimates from sampling data de-meaned by age group
– R2 and standard errors calculated using data de-meaned by age group
– Confidence intervals are bootstrap estimates
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The fit is essentially the same, and the point estimates of σ are not substantially different in terms
of their implications for economic behavior. It is also true that in this case the two coefficients
within the unrestricted models give us separate estimates of σ, and the coefficients on human capital
consistently give slightly higher estimates for σ. The theoretical value νh−νL = 1 is at the left edge
of the relevant confidence intervals (shown at the bottom of the table), so it is at least possible that
the restriction holds.9
1.8 IV estimates of σ
I attempt to correct for potential endogeneity in labor supply in the CPS data by using
relative population levels by age groups as an instrument for labor supply. A potential weakness
of this instrument is that immigration could respond to wage differentials between age groups, so
I use relative population values lagged by one year from the sample month, whereas the wage is
calculated for work done in the year leading up to the sample month. The IV estimates in Columns
3 through 5 of Table 1.1 (with the first stage in column 3, the restricted second stage in column 4,
and unrestricted estimates in Column 5) are comparable to the OLS estimates. Doing a search over
years for the location of a
Again, we can test the coefficient restriction. The 90% confidence interval for the difference
in the coefficients in Column 5 of Table 1.1 is consistent with the structural model’s value of 1.
1.9 Further exploration of the wage-supply relationship in
the data
It is valuable to graph the data to see what we might expect from the relationship between
labor supplied and wages. Figure 1.9 splits up the data by age group and shows average wages
(relative to 25–29-year-olds) against total hours of labor supplied (again relative to 20–24-year-olds)
for each sample year. The sample year is represented with color intensity so that later years are
lighter colors. If there is an overall relationship between the two variables, it is that there is a slight
positive correlation, but we might wonder if the left and right sides of the older workers’ data come
9Both because of concerns about heteroskedasticity and because of poor small-sample performance of IV estimators,
the standard errors and confidence intervals are based on bootstrap estimates.
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from different data generating processes.
(Acemoglu, 2007) discusses the dynamics of directed technology and shows that there was an
early period of falling skill premiums as the relative supply of skilled workers rose that was followed
by a period of positive correlation between the relative supply and relative wage. We may be seeing
a similar pattern here. Early samples for some age groups seem to exhibit a negative relationship
between relative quantities supplied and relative wages (consistent with movement along a labor
demand curve), while later samples are inconsistent with movements along a demand curve. As
pointed out by (Acemoglu, 2007), it could take some time before technology changes respond to
supply shocks enough to shift out demand, creating an essentially null relationship in later years.
These results may weaken the argument of this paper, which relies on the assumption that technology
adjusts to its BGP every year. Alternatively, there could be something correlated with labor supplies
by age group in later years (e.g. labor supplies by schooling group) that is driving the technical
changes. This is a concern that warrants further investigation.
It is also important to note that because Card and Lemieux, 2001 (and Murphy and Welch,
1990, 1992) use pre-1976 data and do not use the later data that I use, that they will see a stronger
negative relationships between wages and labor supplies. Hence C&L estimate a positive elasticity of
substitution, whereas applying their methodology to the data used here produces negative estimates
for the elasticity of substitution. I leave out the pre-1976 data, because using them requires making
very strong assumptions about hours of work over the previous year, and attempts to model labor
supplied based on the information observed in the pre-1976 samples (similar to in Murphy and
Welch, 1990, 1992) produces very low-quality estimates. Cursory analysis suggests that including
pre-1976 data would lower the estimated elasticities if the pre-1976 data followed a similar trend to
the early data presented here.
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Figure 1.9: Labor supply and wage data relative to 25–29-year-olds
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1.10 Estimates with a structural break
One potential interpretation of the evidence in Figure 1.9 is that there was structural break
in the data generating process in the 1980s. This could be due to demographic shifts resulting from
the baby boom or increased educational attainment for post-baby-boom cohorts. If we know the
timing of the break, we can estimate (where Iearly is an indicator for being before the break and
Ilate is an indicator for being after the break):
10
ln
(
wat
w25t
)
= Iearly
[
(σearly − 1) ln
(
hat
h25t
)
+ (σearly − 2) ln
(
Lat
L25t
)]
+
Ilate
[
(σlate − 1) ln
(
hat
h25t
)
+ (σlate − 2) ln
(
Lat
L25t
)]
+
Iearlyαa + Ilateαa + δt + ξa,t
(1.15)
Estimating this model by searching over years for the break indicates that if there is a break,
it is around 1986, the year that maximizes the R2 of the model estimates:
Estimates for the model with a break in 1986 are in Table 1.2. The restricted estimates
in columns 1 and 4 suggest a negative relationship (“weak bias”) between relative hours worked
and relative wages conditional on supply shocks and demand shifts due to directed technology. The
unrestricted estimates in columns 2 and 5 might suggest strong bias as in the pooled regressions
but only for the coefficients on human capital and only for the early period. However, the main
purpose of the unrestricted regressions is to test the restriction on the coefficients on human capital
and labor. There seems to evidence against the restriction (an assumed difference of 1) in both the
early and later periods, but the error is in opposite directions between these periods.
1.11 Be cautious in applying point estimates
The estimates of the elasticity of substitution between workers by age group in the report
are consistently near 2. The higher values in the regressions with earlier and later data pooled imply
“strong bias” under the directed technology framework. This means that as relative labor supply
for a group increased, the increase in technology specific to that group was so great that relative
demand shifted out enough to raise their wages (again in relative terms).
10The age group fixed effects differ in the early and late periods, because these are a function of both σ and the
productivity of innovation for each age group (see Equation 1.12).
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Table 1.2: Least squares estimates of σ with a structural break
OLS IV
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: ln
(
wat
w20t
)
ln
(
Lat
L20t
)
ln
(
wat
w20t
)
Restricted Restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln
(
popat
pop20t
)
(Early) 0.994
(0.0432)
ln
(
popat
pop20t
)
(Late) 1.089
(0.0174)
ln
(
hat
h20t
)
(Early) 0.885 1.093 -1.018 0.920 1.149
(0.0228) (0.0883) (0.2054) (0.0254) (0.0890)
ln
(
hat
h20t
)
(Late) 0.958 0.627 1.288 0.964 0.617
(0.0120) (0.0951) (0.1176) (0.0119) (0.0952)
ln
(
Lat
L20t
)
(Early) -0.115 -0.102 -0.080 -0.076
(0.0228) (0.0238) (0.0254) (0.0250)
ln
(
Lat
L20t
)
(Late) -0.042 -0.014 -0.036 -0.011
(0.0120) (0.0138) (0.0119) (0.0137)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360
Age group × early/late FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.618 0.636 0.620
σh (Early) 1.885 2.093 1.920 2.149
σL (Early) 1.885 1.898 1.920 1.924
C&L σh (Early) 8.72 -10.74 12.57 -6.69
C&L σL (Early) 8.72 9.83 12.57 13.09
σh (Late) 1.958 1.627 1.964 1.617
σL (Late) 1.958 1.986 1.964 1.989
C&L σh (Late) 23.91 2.68 27.75 2.61
C&L σL (Late) 23.91 71.69 27.75 87.80
95% CI for diff btwn h and L coefs (Early) (1.023, 1.338) (1.058, 1.372)
99% CI for diff btwn h and L coefs (Early) (0.975, 1.389) (1.017, 1.431)
99% CI for diff btwn h and L coefs (Late) (0.385, 0.877) (0.372, 0.867)
– Standard errors are in parentheses and are boostrap estimates from sampling data de-meaned by age group
– R2 and standard errors calculated using data de-meaned by age group
– Confidence intervals are bootstrap estimates
22
0.976
0.977
0.978
0.979
0.980
1980 1990 2000 2010
Break Year
R
2
Figure 1.10: R2 from estimating the model allowing σ to differ before and after the indicated year
Note: R2 measures include variation within age groups, because changes in the fit of the model within age
groups are an important component of the effect of changing the location of the break
My results suggest caution in applying the estimates by Card and Lemieux (2001), since
their methodology led to unstable estimates for the elasticity even when the variance of the regression
coefficients was small. An alternative interpretation, of course, is that their methodology is sound
but that the elasticity of substitution varies greatly (and is sometimes negative) over time and with
slight changes in specifications of worker groups.
Readers should also be cautious about applying the estimates here in the wrong context. The
regression coefficients should be generally applicable, but how we should interpret those coefficients
depends on what we know about the scenario at hand. Consider, for instance, that the innovation
possibilities frontier I proposed may be too simplistic. No nation is totally insulated from the supply
of technologies throughout the rest of the world. Suppose that we modified Equation 1.9 to account
for international spillovers of technology:
X˙a = ηa
(
XWa
Xa
)φ
R&Da (1.16)
where XWa is some function of world technology (possibly the maximum or some average of the
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highest values for nearby countries). The ratio
(
XWa
Xa
)
is included to account for the fact that
it is easier for lower-income countries to catch up to the frontier (e.g. Caselli (2005); Caselli and
Coleman (2006); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 2004); Chui et al. (2001)). In this case relative
endogenous technologies will take a slightly different form:
Xa
Xb
=
(
haLa
hbLb
) σ−1
1+σφ
(
XWa
XWb
) σφ
1+σφ
(
ηa
ηb
) σ
1+σφ
(1.17)
Relative wages will similarly depend on the world technologies and the rate of international
spillovers (φ):
wa
wb
=
(
ηa
ηb
) σ−1
1+σφ
(
ha
hb
)σ−φ−2
1+σφ +1
(
La
Lb
)σ−φ−2
1+σφ
(
XWa
XWb
)φ(σ−1)
1+σφ
(1.18)
This new form very clearly changes the way we would interpret regression coefficients, so
that letting γL be the (log-log) regression coefficient on labor supply, the elasticity of substition, σ,
can be recovered as σ = γL+φ+21−γLφ , which is the same as the interpretation in the main body of this
report only when φ = 0.
This discussion might seem to imply that we cannot be confident about the elasticity of
substitution, and to some degree that interpretation is correct. However, we can be confident in
the conclusions we make based on the regression coefficient itself. For instance, the condition on σ
that generates strong technical bias when there are no international technical spillovers is σ > 2.
In the presence of international technical spillovers, this condition changes into σ > 2 + φ. These
inequalities correspond to exactly the same set of regression coefficients. Thus we can say (based on
the regressions presented above) that there is evidence that within the US over the last four decades
there has been strong technical bias between age groups.
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Chapter 2
Directed Technical Change: a
Macro Perspective on Life Cycle
Earnings Profiles1
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Experience-earnings profiles overview
One of the well-known trends in analyses of life-cycle earnings is that earnings are hill-
shaped: they grow quickly early in the career and then slowly late in life2 (as illustrated in Figure
2.1). Typically economists explain this by concluding that human capital accumulation is faster
earlier in the career (Becker, 1964, 1967; Ben-Porath, 1967; Mincer, 1974, 1997). Human capital
accumulation slows late in life both because the cost of investment—foregone wages—increases and
because the benefit decreases (for two reasons: the amount of time over which new human capital can
be used falls as people age and shifting income into the future reduces its present value). These effects
lead to hill-shaped age-earnings or experience-earnings profiles. Because human capital depreciates,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Professors Robert Tamura and Michal Jerzmanowski of Clemson Uni-
versity. I thank them for their contributions.
2The shape of this relationship is so accepted that empirical researchers studying the returns to education assume
that they must have sufficient data to observe it in order to get valid comparisons of the lifetime earnings between
different age groups (Psacharopoulos, 1994).
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it is possible for low returns to human capital accumulation to actually produce late-life decreases in
wages. A supplementary explanation is that human capital depreciation speeds up as workers age.
Years of work experience
W
a
ge
Figure 2.1: An example of the typical pattern of life cycle wage earnings observed in past research.
This relationship is what we want to explain.
These theories are driven by changes in the human capital of the individual worker. However,
I will show that the directed technology framework can produce hill-shaped wage-experience profiles
like those in the actual data without even allowing human capital to vary over the person’s career.
Instead macro-level technology is the main culprit. Before examining the details of the mechanism,
we must look at the theory of directed technical change and work through a formalization of the
model.
2.1.2 Directed Technical Change
Daron Acemoglu’s (1998; 2002; 2003; 2007) theory of directed technical change (DTC) posits
an explanation for historically observed skill premia by showing that innovators have an incentive
to direct their efforts toward technologies that complement inputs that are relatively abundant.
“Technologies” here means ways of organizing inputs that expand the production set.
In the theory, technology is input-specific and the relative returns to development of new
technologies for particular inputs depend positively on the price of the products of that input and
on the abundance of that input (because higher factor abundance allows the innovator to take
advantage of low marginal costs of reproducing known technologies). Note that these two effects
are negatively related along a given demand function for the input: if firms rent more of the input,
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its marginal product will fall. On the other hand, the mechanism of central importance for the
directed technology literature is that innovation shifts the demand curve for the input; when an
input is relatively more abundant, innovators have more incentive to develop technology for that
input because the market for their innovations is larger, and when they do create new technologies
this will improve the productivity of the input, which will increase demand for the input. Thus
the story is that an increase in supply of an input first reduces wages and then induces innovation,
which increases demand and wages. Figure 2.2 illustrates this theory, and the formal model below
explains it more thoroughly.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of directed technical change
Note: An increase in relative factor supply increases the market size for technologies that complement that
factor. These new technologies increase demand for the factor, potentially increasing its wage.
To our knowledge the extant research in this DTC field has focused solely on labor differ-
entiated by skill level (college education, etc.) with hints at applications to earnings of labor versus
capital (e.g. the forthcoming Acemoglu (2014)). However, there is nothing in the theory that is
inherently specific to explaining the wages of skilled and less-skilled workers rather than other classes
of workers or even other productive inputs. We propose that if we are to take the theory seriously,
it must be true that technical development follows productive input abundance for diverse classes
of inputs. This observation follows the well-known standard for any good scientific theory: it ought
to be general and parsimonious.
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I apply the theory to international differences in age demographics with new data from
Tamura, Dwyer, Devereux and Baier (2015) to provide estimates for labor wages for 148 countries
over an average of 120 years that can be compared against observation. I then show that the directed
technical change theory can match some of the curvature in observed age-earnings profiles without
assumptions about on-the-job human capital accumulation that are typically needed to match the
trend.
2.1.3 A new mechanism driving age-earnings profiles
To understand the mechanism, we must think about human capital shares or relative human
capital. Although I have stated that I apply the directed technology framework to age groups, I
technically apply it to a measure of effective labor units3 supplied by age groups. When an age
group supplies a large share of the human capital in a country technology will heavily complement
that age group. Thus different age groups essentially compete for wage-raising technologies.
My contribution is to show that it is not necessary for the individual’s human capital to
decline in order for her wage to grow slowly relative to others’ wages. It is enough that the human
capital possessed by her age group represent a smaller share of the total human capital in the market
because this shrinks the relative profits for innovators producing technology for her age group. This
occurs as people age for three main reasons:
• First, the size of a cohort declines over time as members die.
• Second, in many places new generations are larger than the previous generation because of
high fertility (it takes very low fertility by historical standards for this to not be true).
• Third, younger generations usually have more average human capital than older generations:
parents invest in growing the wealth of their dynasties.
If some of these conditions hold to a sufficient degree, then the market size for technologies
directed at younger workers will be greater than the market size for technologies directed at older
workers, and workers will see their wages stagnate as they age.
In order to get hill-shaped wage patterns over time, we need a little more than this, because
these conditions only produce falling wages as workers age. There are four macro effects we can use
3The measure is a composite of workers’ schooling, the schooling of their ancestors, and the maximum human
capital in the world. See the data section for more details.
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to explain rising wages early in the career:
1. Middle-aged workers have the greatest human capital share, leading to them receiving the bulk
of productivity improvements.
2. Wages rise over time as technology and, hence, productivity improve.
3. The technical frontier for middle-aged or older workers is higher for some reason, lowering the
cost of copying these frontier technologies.
4. There are systematic differences in the ease of innovating for different age groups (due, for
instance, to the different industries or occupations they fill).
The first condition is likely an accurate representation of the world because of the microe-
conomic patterns described by Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1997), but because we do not allow
human capital to grow over lifetimes, we cannot observe it in this paper. Note that although it
would be necessary to allow human capital to change over workers’ lives to observe this condition,
it would still produce a macro effect driving technology improvements for the middle-aged workers
and would induce additional wage curvature on top of the micro effects descibed by Ben-Porath and
Mincer.
The second condition is fairly obviously true, at least over the last two centuries in most
countries. This condition can explain a positive relationship between age and wages in both cross-
sectional and longitudinal research. In the longitudinal case, workers take advantage of improved
technologies as they age. In the case of cross sections, the older workers likely invested less in human
capital when they were young than the currently young workers did because the productivity of
human capital that they would face over their lifetimes was lower, and, hence, the returns on the
investment were lower. This report focuses on longitudinal assessments.
There is no particular reason to suspect the third condition of holding except to the extent
that wage curvature is a characterization of the incentives of those in the frontier economies to invest
in the productivity of middle-aged workers. It might seem silly to use wage curvature to explain
itself, but wthe effect may be self-reinforcing as the higher middle-aged technologies from the frontier
nations spill over into lower-productivity nations.
The fourth condition may seem the least intuitive, but it is what I observe to have the
greatest impact on rising early-life wages in this paper. See Section 2.5.2 for more details.
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This report produces wages for each age group in each country in each decade without
allowing a cohort’s human capital to change throughout its life. I show that for most cohorts the
estimated wages rise and then plateau (and sometimes fall) over the working life.
2.2 Model of directed technical change using age groups and
human capital
The model follows closely with Acemoglu (2002) with two major differences:
1. I use the total human capital provided to the market by a given age group as a productive input
rather than using the quantity of labor supplied by people of different levels of human capital.
This would cause only negligible differences in solving the model (but not in applications to
the data) if we were to simply exchange the two values wherever they occur (we could just
stick an H wherever he has an L). However, because we cannot observe wages per unit of
human capital, I solve the model for the wage per unit of labor. Thus the factor wages that
concern us are not equivalent to those used by Acemoglu (in terms of their role in determining
technology).
2. Because I look at cross-country differences, I modify the technology accumulation function
to limit scale effects and to incorporate country-level innovation productivities (as in Jerz-
manowski and Tamura, 2015).
2.2.1 Final Goods
Aggregate output Y is produced competitively with intermediate goods Ya according to
4
Y =
[∑
Y
−1

a
] 
−1
(2.1)
4A more general version of this production function would seem to be one that allows for different weights on the
intermediate goods:
Y =
[∑
γaY
−1

a
] 
−1
However, these weights are not separately identified from the levels of production of the intermediate goods (which
are not observed) and the technology levels that lead to that production. Thus we normalize γa = 1 and allow the
production of intermediate goods to capture all aspects of the value of constituent markets in final good production.
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Final good output is the numeraire, so
∑
P 1−a = 1 (2.2)
The typical final good producer purchases intermediate goods at prices Pa and faces the
problem
max{Ya}
{
Y −
∑
PaYa
}
⇒ Pa
Pb
=
(
Ya
Yb
)− 1
(2.3)
where b indicates a second age group. If we combine Equation 2.3 with a zero profit condi-
tion, we get that
Pa = Y Y
− 1
a
(∑
b
Y
−1

b
)−1
(2.4)
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced competitively using machines κa, labor La, and human
capital ha that are specific to the intermediate good:
Ya =
1
1− β (haLa)
β
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx (2.5)
In this particular application, the labor types are age groups, so readers can think of these interme-
diate goods industries indexed by a as composite sets of services offered to the market by workers of
different ages. There is a continuum of length Xa of machine types indexed by x, representing the
level of technology in age group (sector) a, Ya sells at price Pa, machines of type x can be rented at
the price pa (x), and workers of age group a get paid wage wa. Thus the problem for the intermediate
good producer is
maxκ,L
[
Pa
1− β (haLa)
β
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx−
∫ Xa
0
pa (x)κa (x) dx− waLa
]
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2.2.3 Demand for machines
I assume that first order conditions hold with equality. Then profit maximization condition
with respect to machines of for age group a is that
Pa (haLa)
β
κa (x)
−β
= pa (x)
The monopolist with the blueprint for a given line of machine produces and maintains each
unit of the machine with a unit of capital5 rented at price R. Thus the stock of capital is always equal
to the stock of machines. Each monopolist has a competitor who can produce the same machine at
cost υR, so the monopolist sets the limit price pa (x) = υR. The demand for a machine line for age
group a for a given capital rental rate is then
κa (x) =
(
Pa
υR
) 1
β
haLa (2.6)
which is independent of the type x of machine. Production of intermediate goods then takes the
form
Ya =
1
1− β
(
Pa
υR
) 1−β
β
XahaLa (2.7)
Combined with equation 2.3, this means that
Pa
Pb
=
(
XahaLa
XbhbLb
)− βσ
(2.8)
where σ = 1 + (− 1)β is the elasticity of substitution between worker age groups conditional on
fixed technology.
2.2.4 Monopoly profits for machine blueprint owners
The stream of profits per unit of κa is (υ − 1)R, so the stream of profits per machine
blueprint is
pia = (υ − 1)Rκa = υ − 1
υ
P
1
β
a haLa (υR)
β−1
β (2.9)
5This is like assuming that one unit of capital can produce one unit of machine per unit of time and then machines
depreciate fully but capital does not. The reader can think of machines as capital that has been temporarily repurposed
for a specific method of production.
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2.2.5 Demand for labor
The profit maximization condition with respect to labor is that
wa =
β
1− βPa (haLa)
β
L−1a
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx
Combined with the condition for machines, this gives us that
wa =
β
1− βP
1
β
a (υR)
− 1−ββ Xaha (2.10)
which means that the relative wages are
wa
wb
=
Xa
Xb
(
Pa
Pb
) 1
β ha
hb
(2.11)
Combining 2.11 with 2.8 gives
wa
wb
=
(
Xaha
Xbhb
)σ−1
σ
(
La
Lb
)− 1σ
(2.12)
2.2.6 Allocation of capital
Because one unit of capital produces one machine and machine varieties are symmetric
industries within age groups, Ka (x) = κa (x), the total capital used in an intermediate good market
is
Ka =
∫ Xa
0
κa (x) dx = Xaκa = Xa
(
Pa
υR
) 1
β
haLa (2.13)
Foregone consumption produces capital K, which is allocated between the intermediate
goods markets to produce machines. The relative capital allocations (using the relative prices already
derived) are
Ka
Kb
=
(
XahaLa
XbhbLb
)σ−1
σ
(2.14)
We can find the values of capital allocated to each age group by considering that
Ka = K
[∑
b
Kb
Ka
]−1
= K
[∑
b
(
XbhbLb
XahaLa
)σ−1
σ
]−1
(2.15)
which we will need to determine the levels of technology for each age group.
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2.2.7 Interest rates
In order to get the rental rate, write the intermediate good output as
Ya =
1
1− βK
1−β
a (XahaLa)
β
(2.16)
and note that the marginal product of capital in this market is
MPKa = (1− β)Pa Ya
Ka
(2.17)
Capital market equilibrium requires that υR = MPKa, so
PaYa = RKa
υ
1− β (2.18)
The intermediate goods markets adjust so that there are zero profits in the final good market,
so the sum of the five age-group-specific versions of Equation 2.18 must equal Y , which requires that
R =
1− β
υ
Y
K
(2.19)
The interest rate in this economy must be the rate that could be earned by producing
capital:
r = (1− τ)R− δ = (1− τ) 1− β
υ
Y
K
− δ (2.20)
where τ is the tax rate on capital income and δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
2.2.8 Consumption Demand
For simplicity, assume a continuum of measure6 1 of infinitely-lived consumers with CRRA
preferences over a single consumption good over time. Consumers can borrow and lend at the interest
rate r. The representative consumer earns income equal to the aggregate output of final goods and
spends it on consumption C, investment in capital I, and research and development efforts R&D.
6The choice of size of the consumer base does not impact the results, because this analysis looks at income per
worker rather than income per consumer. This normalization is simply convenient for talking about a representative
consumer.
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With preferences ordered by
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
C1−θt − 1
1− θ dt (2.21)
consumption growth will be
C˙
C
=
1
θ
(r − ρ) (2.22)
Thus along the balanced growth path (BGP), r must be constant.
2.2.9 Technological innovation
There are multiple countries that build their own stock of technology with R&D expendi-
tures (foregone consumption) with the following innovation possibilities frontier:
X˙a =
ηa
ζ
R&Da
hL
(2.23)
where
∑
aR&Da = R&D , L is the size of the labor force, h =
∑
aha
La
L is the average
human capital of the labor force, XWa is the world frontier technology, ηa determines age-specific
productivity of innovation7, and ζ is a country-specific innovation entry barrier that tells us how
many units of R&D expenditure are equivalent to one unit of R&D expenditure in the US (with the
normalization that ζUSA = 1).
R&Da
ζ should be thought of as the effective expenditure on R&D,
with any losses due to poor institutions.
This form is different from that used by Acemoglu because R&D expenditures are scaled by
the size of the labor force to reduce scale effects. I justify this by recognizing that people compete to
produce new technologies by partially duplicating efforts. Additionally, the purpose of the innovation
technology in this paper is to fit sectoral differences within countries. It is not within the scope of
the work to explain international variation in outcomes with differences in average human capital,
and this functional form allows us to abstract away from that issue.
Although the owners of machine blueprints produce their machines with some market power
once they have the blueprint, there is free entry into innovation. One unit of R&D expenditure
produces a stream of ηaζ
1
hL new blueprints, each with a present value Va, so free entry requires
1 =
ηa
ζ
Va
hL
(2.24)
7I consider and reject a version without η. See Appendix C.
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and
Va
Vb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)−1
(2.25)
2.2.10 Characterizing the balanced growth path
No arbitrage requires that
rVa = pia + V˙a (2.26)
This application deals only with the balanced growth path8. Along the BGP, V˙a = 0. Using
the value for instantaneous profits from Equation 2.9, the BGP values of machine blueprints must
satisfy
Va =
pia
r
=
υ − 1
υr
P
1
β
a haLa (υR)
β−1
β (2.27)
and
Va
Vb
=
(
Pa
Pb
) 1
β haLa
hbLb
=
(
Xa
Xb
)− 1σ (haLa
hbLb
)σ−1
σ
using Equation 2.8 to give us the relative prices. Combining this with the equilibrium condition
in 2.25 gives us a relationship between relative technology between age groups, relative frontier
technology between age groups, and relative productivity of innovation between age groups:
Xa
Xb
=
(
haLa
hbLb
)σ−1(
ηa
ηb
)σ
(2.28)
We can get this relationship in terms of relative wages, which are observable, rather than
relative technologies, which are not, by using the labor market equilibrium condition in Equation
2.12:
wa
wb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)σ−1(
ha
hb
)σ−1(
La
Lb
)σ−2
(2.29)
Knowing the relative technologies (Equation 2.28) will allow us to determine the actual
levels of technology, which we will want in order to estimate the technical frontier. Using Equation
8Although Acemoglu (2007) showed that off-BGP trends may be needed to match historical changes in skill premia
because the price effect dominates the short run and the market size effect often dominates in the long run, I do not
expect this to be a substantial weakness of my work. The reason is that when workers age, they are simply moving to
a different but established role in the economy rather than changing the expected distribution of workers across ages.
If there were instead a sudden, unexpected age demographic shock, then this could cause problems for this analysis.
The baby boom is one potential shock, but innovators had over an entire decade to prepare for this shock (average
fertility rates are not private information). Other potential shocks are wars, which may differentially kill young, male
workers) and diseases, which often differentially kill older workers).
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2.16 and the final good production function,
Y =
1
1− β
(∑
a
[
(haLaXa)
β
K1−βa
] −1

) 
−1
⇒ Xb =

Y (1− β)(∑
a
[(
haLa
Xa
Xb
)β
K1−βa
] −1

) 
−1

1
β
(2.30)
where the values of Ka above are those determined by Equation 2.15.
Combining the condition on relative technologies in Equation 2.28 with what we know about
relative intermediate goods prices from Equation 2.8, we find that
Pa
Pb
=
(
haLa
hbLb
)−β (
ηa
ηb
)−β
(2.31)
which depends only on observables (when we substitute the values for relative η from Equation 2.29).
Using the price normalization from Equation 2.2 we find a form for the levels of intermediate goods
prices that also depends only on observed values. They must satisfy
Pa =
[∑
b
(
Pb
Pa
)1−] −11−
(2.32)
2.2.11 Bias and elasticities of substitution
“Weak bias” is defined to mean that when the relative supply of a factor increases its relative
technology also increases. This is equivalent to saying that demand for the factor increases when
its supply increases (see Figure 2.2). “Strong bias” occurs when an increase in the relative supply
of a factor leads to an increase in its relative wage, which occurs when there is a large increase in
demand for the factor due to increases in technology.
It is clear from Equation 2.28 that we have weak bias as long as σ > 1. That is: any
increase in the relative total human capital of a particular age group induces a relative increase in
the technology used by that age group. Note that an increase in human capital could occur either
because the quantity of labor supplied increases or because the average human capital of workers
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increases.
Strong bias requires more strict conditions on substitutability of workers. Using Equation
2.29 we can see that an increase in the relative average human capital of a particular age of workers
will always increase their relative wage when σ > 1, but an increase in the labor share supplied by
a particular age group will lead to an increase in its relative wage only when σ > 29.
The wage used in Equation 2.29 is not the wage for the factor that really matters for
production. Rather firms care about the total human capital provided to them. If we were to look
at the typical story of technical bias using this model, we would ask how changes in the total human
capital provided to a sector impact the wage earned (or technology used) by a unit of human capital
in that sector. Although the question that interests us is not “how much does human capital earn?”
but “how much do people earn?”, seeing if we have strong bias in the typical sense requires knowing
the wage per unit of human capital:
wa/ha
wb/hb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)σ−1(
haLa
hbLb
)σ−2
(2.33)
As expected (because we are taking average human capital as exogenous, and producers care
only about the total human capital they hire), the relative wage per unit of human capital depends
only on the relative total human capital between age groups. We have strong technical bias as long
as σ > 2. It is not surprising that this condition is the same as the one for strong bias using just
the relative supplies of labor. The reason is that the total human capital can be increased either
by increasing the quantity of labor supplied or by increasing the average human capital. Thus the
condition for strong bias from increasing total human capital will be the stronger of the conditions
for getting strong bias from either of these. This result for bias in the relative wages paid to human
capital is the same as for those paid to labor in Acemoglu (2002).
9Alternative forms for the innovation possibilities frontier might include international technical spillovers (see e.g.
Jerzmanowski and Tamura, 2015), but they have only a minor impact for this analysis, so I leave them out for
simplicity. The condition for strong bias in the case with international technical spillovers of stronger, but assuming
these spillovers also can change estimates for the elasticity of substitution by the same magnitude as the change in
the threshold for strong bias (see Section 1.11)
38
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Income, labor force, and physical capital
The data on income, physical capital, populations by age group, labor force size, and human
capital are from Tamura, Dwyer, Devereux and Baier (2015) (TDDB), who get their income data
mainly from the Maddison Project. The data include observations on 146 countries over the years
1790 to 2010.
Early in the sample, the number of countries represented is small relative to late in the
sample (one country in 1790, 16 in 1800, and 54 in 1820 compared to 146 in 1990). I use only the
data from 1820 on, because there are so few countries present before 1820. The data from TDDB are
available at variable frequencies. I construct decadal data by interpolating10 the values for countries
whose data are for years other than multiples of 10.
Because these data do not include explicit information on the amount of labor supplied from
particular age groups, I assume that persons from every (working age) age group are equally likely
to supply labor. Thus if L is the size of the labor force and s1524 is the proportion of the working
aged population11 that is aged 15–24, then the size of the labor force for ages 15–24 is taken to be
s1524L. I also assume that members of the labor force have the same average human capital as the
population in their age group.
2.3.2 Human capital
The human capital estimates have with intergenerational transfers and between-country
spillover effects as in TDDB. This form reflects the fact that parents with more human capital
can invest more in their children’s human capital through efforts outside of the labor market and
schooling. The international spillovers reflect the possibility that more investment in human capital
in one place may improve the available technology for human capital production.
I do not allow experience to impact human capital because this effect may confound the
technology effects discussed here. For instance, if people begin to earn lower wages late in life,
this may be due either to the technology available to them or to changes in human capital. This
10Most data years are multiples of 10, so this only matters in a few cases.
11Working age is 15–64 in this case. Some members of the labor force are outside of this age range, and the validity
of this approach depends on the number of such workers being small.
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specification allows us to address how changes in the technology used throughout life can account
for observed age-earnings profiles.
The algorithm for calculating the human capital data is taken from TDDB. It includes three
major components:
• Higher average schooling raises the cohort’s human capital.
• Intergenerational transfers raise the human capital of a cohort if the previous cohort in that
nation had high human capital.
• There are positive externalities on human capital accumulation from the world supply of human
capital.
For comparison, I also solve the model with human capital with an experience effect (again as in
TDDB), where the size of the effect of experience is based on estimates from Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare (1997).
2.3.3 US wages
Relative wages for different age groups in the United States come from wage micro data
for full-time workers12 over 16 from the US Census from 1940 to 2010 (Ruggles et al., 2010), which
reports the income each person earned from wages over the last year and the number of weeks the
person worked over the last year. These data are censored, and every person who earned more than
the top code is assumed to earn 150% of the top code.
Although one of the age groups in this paper is persons aged 15 to 24, the Census gives
wage data only for persons older than 16, so I must assume that the average wages of persons aged
15 to 24 are similar to average wages of persons aged 16 to 24.
Because Tamura et al. (2015) use average schooling levels to construct their human capital
estimates, in order to be consistent, I use only workers whose schooling attainment is within one
year of the average they report.
Table 2.1 shows the average relative wage values (rounded) used in section 2.4 to find the
age-specific research productivities. These are not real wages and are comparable only within time
periods. Only their ratios for this analysis.
12Full time workers here are those for whom the WKSWORK2 variable—as defined by IPUMS—is 4, 5, or 6. From
1950 on, these are workers who worked at least 40 weeks for profit or pay in the previous calendar year. In 1940, these
are workers who estimated that they worked an equivalent of 40 full-time weeks or more in the previous calendar year.
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Table 2.1: Relative US wages by age group
Year 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
1940 1 1.531094 1.858733 2.000964 1.981202
1950 1 1.433281 1.565728 1.56728 1.605344
1960 1 1.503833 1.657948 1.640844 1.604354
1970 1 1.557603 1.556575 1.607562 1.507444
1980 1 1.476986 1.680514 1.603107 1.572386
1990 1 1.714991 2.062006 2.022685 1.735932
2000 1 1.601674 1.778192 1.907719 1.738758
2010 1 1.708349 2.088417 1.984855 1.912004
In any given year, the youngest people have the lowest wages. While younger people may
have lower education because they have not yet finished their education, I selected only the workers
whose education is similar to the lifetime average for their cohort. If there is a problem, it is not that
I ignore education but that young people who finish their education early might be systematically
different from those who finish their education later. This is unlikely to be an issue for older age
groups, since the average education for a cohort in the US is never more than three years of college.
While work experience almost certainly contributes to wage differences between ages, the point of
this paper is to imagine a world in which this is not true so that we can put upper bounds on the
strengths of other effects.
One important question for this analysis is what shape of age-earnings profile we should
expect to reproduce. Although many macro estimates produce declining late-life wages (e.g. Bils
and Klenow, 2000; Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997; Tamura et al., 2015), Murphy and Welch
(1990) and Murphy and Welch (1992) found that these declines were small or non-existent and
Casanova (2013) showed that individual wage per hour of work may not decline over the normal
working life, whereas measured reductions are typically due to averaging over people who work
different amounts. Even though this paper averages wages over workers with variable hours worked,
all of these workers reported working more than 40 hours per week, which should limit reductions
due to retirement and increased part-time work. After deflating the calculated wage levels by the
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers CPI, the wage data recreate the pattern of increasing
wages over the entire (working) lifetime, as seen in Figure 2.3. If the US is typical, then a good fit
by the directed technology model would produce increasing wages over the normal working lifetime
with reductions in the rate of growth of wages (but not reductions in the levels of wages) later in
life.
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Figure 2.3: Each US cohort’s wages rise throughout its life
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2.4 Fitting the model
2.4.1 Solution algorithm
I assume that the data are observations from balanced growth paths (BGP). For each decade
a new BGP for each country can be calculated using the following process:
1. Choose values for the parameters σ, β, υ, ρ, θ, g and δ.
2. Use Equation 2.29 to calibrate the values of η (the age-specific innovation productivities) to
the US wage data. Assign the 1940 values of ηaηb to each of the years before 1940, because there
are not appropriate wage data for those years.
3. Construct relative wages for each of the other countries with Equation 2.29.
4. Solve for XaXb using Equation 2.28.
5. Solve for KaKb using Equation 2.14.
6. Solve for levels of
(a) Ka using Equation 2.15,
(b) Ka using Equation 2.15,
(c) Xa using Equation 2.30,
(d) sectoral prices using Equation 2.4, and
(e) wages using Equation 2.10.
2.4.2 Parameters
2.4.2.1 β, υ, ρ, g, and r
I choose β = 2/3 in line with a long tradition of estimates on the share of income going
to capital (Mankiw et al., 1992; Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1996, 1999b;
and Caselli, 2005 among many others). I use a value of 1.4 for the markup υ in line with the
work of Basu (1996), Norbin (1993), Comı´n (2004), and Jerzmanowski and Tamura (2015). I follow
Jerzmanowski and Tamura (2015) and choose the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution to be 1,
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the time discount rate to be 0.04, the depreciation rate to be 6%, and the frontier productivity
growth rate to be 1.2%. Together these choices produce an equilibrium world interest rate (in the
absence of capital distortions) of 5.2%.
2.4.2.2 Elasticity of substitution, σ
Card and Lemieux (2001) estimate the elasticity of substitution between age groups of
workers with the same education level in the US, UK, and Canada, with typical estimates ranging
from 4 to 6. Although the interpretation of this elasticity differs slightly from σ, the elasticity of
substitution between human capital from different age groups, if workers of different ages from the
same education group have similar human capital, then the measures should be similar. In fact, the
elasticity of substitution between labor provided by different age groups is the same in our model as
the elasticity of substitution between human capital provided by different age groups (provided that
average human capital is not permitted to respond to changes in labor supply). The comparability
between their case and ours is helped by the fact that they use workers with exactly a high school
degree or exactly a 4-year college degree. Their specification—like ours—imposes that the elasticity
of substitution between age groups is the same within college-educated and high-school-educated
groups. Hopefully future work will test this restriction.
Chapter 1 shows that the Card and Lemieux estimates may be inappropriate in the presence
of directed technology and estimated σ with almost the same model setup used here with estimates
at approximately 2 and a lower bound around 1.8.
σ = 2 is the boundary between strong and weak bias and is consistent with estimates from
Chapter 1, so I report estimates with this value in the main body of this chapter. Because estimates
by Card and Lemieux (2001) are well above the level needed for strong bias and estimates in Chapter
1 cluster near the boundary between strong and weak bias, I am fairly confident that performing the
analyses with values of 6, 3, 2, and 1.7 (both lower than all estimates from Chapter 1 and a typical
value for the elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled workers) for σ will give a good
idea of the possible solutions. Appendix B reports results with multiple values for σ, finding that
the estimates change little when σ is allowed to vary over a reasonable range. This chapter reports
only results with σ = 2 for brevity.
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2.5 Sources of life-cycle wage profiles in detail
2.5.1 Why does wage growth fall late in life?
To understand why wages fall late in life in this framework, think about human capital
shares or relative human capital. When an age group supplies a large share of the human capital in
a country, technology will heavily complement that age group. Thus different age groups essentially
compete for wage-raising technologies.
Directed technology works on input shares, and an increase in the human capital share for
one age group will always increase its relative technology (for reasonable values of σ), but this report
is interested in the impact on wages. Human capital shares are determined both by labor shares
and by relative human capital per worker. Section 2.2.11 already showed that increasing relative
human capital per worker always increases relative wages and that whether an increase in relative
labor supply increases or decreases relative wages depends on σ.
There are three possible scenarios, depending on the value of σ:
Scenario 1: strong bias If σ is large enough for strong bias, then a decrease in the share of total
human capital possessed by an age group is sufficient to put downward pressure13 on their
wage.
Scenario 2: weak bias If σ is much smaller than the boundary between strong and weak bias
(but still larger than 1—a constraint of little concern, given estimates from Chapter 1), then
a decrease in the average human capital per worker in an age group relative to other workers’
human capital14 is necessary but not sufficient for directed technology to exert downward
pressure on their wages. A decrease in the human capital share is not sufficient in this case,
because decreases in the share of the labor force made up by an age group will push their
wages up, working against this effect.
Scenario 3: boundary If σ is on the boundary between weak and strong bias (as we estimated—
see section 2.4.2.2), then changes in labor force shares will have negligible effects on wages,
and any changes in average human capital will dominate. Thus in this case, a decrease in
13We say “downward pressure” because there are factors that contribute to a general upward trend in wages, and
we will discuss these shortly.
14Note that this is not the same as their individual human capital falling, since relative human capital can fall
simply by being in a world where others have more human capital
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the average human capital possessed by workers of zir age group relative to that possessed by
other workers is sufficient to put downward pressure on wages.
Table 2.2 helps to organize this information.
↑ hahb ↑ LaLb ↑ haLahbLb
Strong bias: σ > 2 ↑ wawb ↑ wawb ↑ wawb
Weak bias: σ < 2 ↑ wawb ↓ wawb Ambiguous
No bias: σ = 2 ↑ wawb No effect Ambiguous
Table 2.2: Effect of changes in the relative human capital and labor shares on relative wages condi-
tional on σ, the elasticity of substitution between worker age groups
Human capital shares fall as people age for three main reasons:
• First, the size of a cohort declines over time as members die.
• Second, in many places new generations are larger than the previous generation because of
high fertility (it takes very low fertility by historical standards for this to not be true).
• Third, younger generations usually have more average human capital than older generations:
parents invest in growing the wealth of their dynasties.
These facts increase the market size for technologies directed at younger workers, thereby raising the
relative technology for young workers. The first and second facts will contribute to higher wages for
young workers only in the first scenario (strong bias), whereas the third fact contributes to higher
wages when young for any reasonable values of σ.
If the human capital effects dominate the population demographic effects or if the elasticity
of substitution is high, then workers will see their wages stagnate as they age. Because Chapter 1
estimates the elasticity of substitution to be statistically indistinguishable from the cutoff between
strong and weak bias, I assume that population share changes have a small effect on relative wages.
Figure 2.4 shows that human capital shares for younger age groups are indeed higher than
for older age groups in the US. Other countries typically produce the same result. We also see this
pattern even though the United States (like many other countries) is aging, as seen in Figure 2.5.
This occurs because of increases in education over time and intergenerational transfers of skills.
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Figure 2.4: Age distribution of human capital in the US
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Figure 2.5: Age distribution of labor in the US
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If we split these data up into time series for each cohort, the pattern becomes even more
clear. Figure 2.6 does this with human capital for each cohort relative to the human capital of 15–24-
year-olds in the given year. Every curve starts at 1, because each cohort consists of 15–24-year-olds
when it is young. Because of increased schooling over time and inter-generational transfers, workers
almost always lose relative human capital throughout their lives even though the actual level of
human capital is constant for each cohort by construction. What matters here is that they have less
human capital than the younger generations that follow them.
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Figure 2.6: Cohort human capital per worker relative to 15–24-year-olds’ in the US
So far we have discussed relative wages between age groups within the same time period,
so this analysis does not exactly tell us what will happen to people as they age. However, if age
groups’ relative technologies are fairly constant over time and the levels of technologies are fairly
constant, then moving into a different age group will produce wage gains that can be captured well
by looking at the relative technologies for the two age groups involved.
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2.5.2 Why do wages rise early in life?
We have explained why wages would fall over a worker’s life, but why do they first rise?
Equation 2.29 is shown again below to help with the exposition.
wa
wb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)σ−1(
ha
hb
)σ−1(
La
Lb
)σ−2
(2.29 revisited)
We have already discussed the roles of human capital and labor. The other factor affecting relative
wages is the relative productivity of innovation, which I estimate to rise over the lifetime, as seen
in Figure 2.7. The reason why wages are highest in midlife is essentially that there are decreasing
returns to η and to human capital, so wages are higher when each term is at a medium level than
when one term is large and the other small. Middle age is the time when a cohort both possesses
somewhat high relative human capital and easy innovation.
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Figure 2.7: Fitted productivities of innovation, η, for each cohort throughout its life
In addition to η’s effect on relative wages, generic growth of technology over time raises the
levels of wages, but this effect is small compared to the role played by movements into and out of
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groups with higher or lower ηs15.
2.6 Wage hills produced by the model
In fitting the model I produce wages for each age group in each country in each year without
allowing a cohort’s human capital to change throughout its life. I also construct work experience
as the number of years that a cohort has been in the labor force on average, finding that for most
cohorts wages rise and then plateau over the working life.
Figure 2.8 shows typical life-cycle wage trends for the United States, France, and China (see
Appendix D for the same patterns for all countries). Each line is the life path of one birth cohort.
For instance, the highest curve in the graph for France tells us how the wages constructed for French
people born between 1946 and 1955 (with an average approximately in 1950) grow throughout their
lives. 1950 is the last cohort that has completed its normal working age. Later cohorts are generally
higher in the graph because incomes around the world grew over our sample period. Maximum
experience falls for later cohorts because they spend more time in school on average. These graphs
clearly show the point that in many cases the model’s predicted wages rise and then plateau over
the working life.
It is interesting to note that the analysis does not predict that this trend holds at all times
in all countries. For instance, the 1950-born and 1930-born cohorts in China see rapid growth of
predicted wage throughout their lives as they worked through a period when total factor productivity
exploded. The reason for these exceptions is that the mechanisms described in the Section 2.5.1
are weak in these cases. There is nothing inherent in the theory that requires quadratic experience-
earnings profiles; they are instead a product of the observed labor demographics. However, this does
not mean that we should expect to see wages growing steadily throughout life in actual data in all
of the exceptional cases, because the mechanism used here is not the only one that matters. These
results do not undermine the extant theories that explain hill-shaped life cycle earnings trends. Micro
effects as identified by Ben-Porath and Mincer almost certainly produce declining wage growth in
many cases. However, these results suggest caution when talking about the causes of late-life wage
reductions because the evidence is ambiguous and some of the trend could be explained by directed
15Eliminating the differences in η by setting ηat = 1 ∀ a, t eliminates much of the upward trend in wages for a
cohort. This is not to say that long-run productivity growth is not important—it simply does not explain well the
observed life-cycle patterns.
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Figure 2.8: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher
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technology.
The reader should recall that the model and data proscribe Mincerian returns to experience
by construction. The slopes of the curves in Figure 2.8 are what they are because of generic pro-
ductivity growth, (somewhat arbitrary) differences in costs of innovation, and directed technology,
which mimic returns to experience.
To estimate the average size of the apparent Mincer returns to experience that the model
produces, consider regressions of the form
ln (wc,t−a,t) = Tt + αc,t−a + γ1XPRc,t−a,t + γ2XPR2c,t−a,t + χ
Kc,t−a,t
Lc,t−a,t
+ µc,t−a,t (2.34)
where t− a indexes a birth cohort (indicated by its approximate birth year) in country c in year t.
I consider specifications both with and without year fixed effects (imposing Tt = 0 ∀ t) and with
and without physical capital (imposing χ= 0).
The case with the year fixed effects does a better job of forcing experience to capture only
the changes due specifically to directed technology (rather than generic income growth over time, for
instance), but the purpose of this exercise is not to show how much curvature is induced by directed
technology. If it were, it would be pointless to use experience as a proxy. Rather this report is
interested in the ability of the theory to reproduce data that are typically explained as being a result
of experience. Thus the main interest is in the case without year fixed effects (e.g. Tt = 0 ∀ t),
which allows experience to capture all of the (average quadratic) curvature in the lines in Figure 2.8
and is more in line with others’ work.
Accumulation of technology affects capital allocations between age groups and the incentives
to purchase more capital, but we may wish to know how much of the curvature in earnings is due
only to technology without allowing for these secondary effects. Some specifications of the regression
include physical capital per worker to help answer this question, but the main interest of this paper is
in fitting the cohort-level curvature in Figure 2.8 to experience, so the main interest is in regressions
that do not include physical capital. Human capital is not included in the regressions because that
is picked up by the fixed effects.
Results from these regressions are in Table 2.3. The primary estimate of interest, Regres-
sion 1, shows that on average a decade increase in work experience is associated with a propor-
tional increase in real wage of approximately .600 − .049 (Decades of Experience) or that a year
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increase in work experience is associated with a proportional increase in real wage of approximately
.0606 − .0005 (Years of Experience). These are similar to the estimates of .0512 and -.00071 of the
actual wage structure using international macro data from Bils and Klenow (2000) and preliminary
estimates from an early (1996) copy of that same paper of .0495 and .0007, which were used in
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999a), and TDDB (the analysis in this chap-
ter does not depend on those values, since I did not include any experience effect on human capital).
Thus workers early in their career can expect to earn approximately 6% more after a year, whereas
after 40 years in the labor force they could expect approximately a mere 2.08% raise over the next
year. For comparison, world GDP growth is around (and the model solutions assume exactly) 2%.
Table 2.3: Wage-experience regression results
Log of Yearly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decades of Experience 0.600∗∗∗ −0.786∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗
(0.010) (0.281) (0.010) (0.213)
Decades of Experience2 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Capital per worker 0.665∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Wage maximizing exp (dec.) 6.14 −5.99 8.27 −8.35
Year FE No Y es No Y es
Cohort×Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 9,889 9,889 9,889 9,889
R2 0.717 0.266 0.838 0.579
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.194 0.613 0.423
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
The negative coefficients on Experience in regressions 2 and 4 in the presence of year fixed
effects show that generic growth of worker productivity over time and fitted values of ηs account for
the positive slopes of the curves in Figure 2.8. However, concavity of the experience-earnings profile
remains despite controlling for years.
Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 2.3 show that much of the upward trend in wages is explained
by capital growth and allocation. When accounting for capital growth and allocation, wage raises
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fall more slowly, but the location of the peak is still at approximately 60 years.
Figure 2.9 shows estimates from column 1 (without year effects or capital as a regressor)
beside Bils and Klenow’s (2000) values of .0512 and -.00071. My coefficient on the linear term is
slightly larger than theirs and my quadratic term is slightly smaller, making the curve from the
estimates in this paper steeper with a later peak. Note that the heights of the curves are not
significant here, since the heights depend on the values of the covariates observed in the data,
which I have simply assumed to be values that place the curves close together in the 10–30 years
of experience range in order to draw the figure. In line with findings by Murphy and Welch (1990),
Murphy and Welch (1992), and Casanova (2013) that older workers do not experience wage decreases
as long as they remain in full-time jobs, the estimates from regression 1 place the peak beyond the
usual working life. I believe that this is a strength of my fit over previous macro estimates (e.g. Bils
and Klenow, 1996, 2000).
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Figure 2.9: Predicted log wage from Regression (1) in table 2.4 and from Bils and Klenow (2000)
As an additional representation of this scenario, consider what would happen if we allowed
work experience to impact human capital. In this case we would want to see if life cycle wage profiles
have curvature that is not explained by TDDB’s best estimate of the role of experience in producing
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human capital. Thus we regress the wage per unit of human capital on experience:
ln
(
wc,t−a,t
hc,t−a,t
)
= Tt + αc,t−a + γ1XPRc,t−a,t + γ2XPR2c,t−a,t + χ
Kc,t−a,t
Lc,t−a,t
+ µc,t−a,t (2.35)
Table 2.4 presents the estimates. We must reject the hypothesis that the quadratic term is negative,
so these results do not show that directed technology explains wage curvature that is not explained
by experience. However, there are two points to keep in mind with this result.
The first is that showing that DTC is necessary to explain wage hills is not the goal of
this work. The point of this report is to show the ambiguity in the data: the theories that di-
rected technical change causes wage curvature and that experience causes wage curvature are nearly
observationally equivalent. Either or both could be the cause.
The second point is that the hypothesis test of a negative quadratic term is not very closely
tied to the hypothesis that DTC induces curvature beyond that induced by experience effects. The
reason is that experience effects on human capital are fit to observed age-earnings profiles. In fact
the method of constructing human capital with experience effects presupposes that DTC does not
induce wage curvature. Thus the test here is essentially the hypothesis that DTC could explain
additional curvature that could not possibly be explained by a measure of experience constructed
explicitly to match experience–earnings profiles. This test simply states that we cannot conclude
that directed technology adds any explanatory power beyond the standard theories used to explain
wage hills.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
This work has attempted to show that directed technical change can account for some of the
curvature in life cycle earnings without assumptions about on-the-job human capital accumulation
that are typically needed to match the trend. This effect occurs because of the relative human capital
of cohorts, supplementing other researchers’ theories regarding the effects of individual human capital
choices on life cycle earnings profiles. I should reiterate here that this chapter has not shown that
directed technology replaces the other theories; what I have shown is that the framework can explain
the same data. Some or all of the proposed theories could contribute to the observed effect. Future
research should attempt to rule out theories based on more than just their ability to match this one
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Table 2.4: Wage-Experience regression results with experience effect on human capital
Log of Yearly Wage per unit of Human Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decades of Experience 0.099∗∗∗ 0.041 −0.143∗∗∗ 0.303
(0.009) (0.274) (0.010) (0.244)
Decades of Experience2 0.006∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Capital per worker 0.400∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Wage maximizing exp (dec.) −7.92 7.5 2.09 −6.8
Year FE No Y es No Y es
Cohort×Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 8,814 8,814 8,814 8,814
R2 0.402 0.001 0.535 0.205
Adjusted R2 0.295 0.001 0.392 0.150
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
effect.
This chapter has three major implications for estimations of human capital and returns to
schooling:
• Changes in experience are negatively correlated with changes in cohort human capital relative
to the workforce in late life and, therefore, with changes in age-specific productive technology.
• Individual investments in human capital are correlated with cohort investments in human
capital and, therefore, with changes in productive technology. This correlation can create an
illusory correlation with individual wages.
• Individual investments in human capital have external effects on other workers’ productivity
through the directed technology mechanism, and estimates of returns to education or other
human capital investments should include this effect.
Consider estimates of human capital derived from fitting life cycle earnings trends. If the
human capital estimates are required to account for the entire variation in wages, then the variance of
human capital will be high. Allowing directed technical development to explain some of the variance
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in wages will produce human capital estimates that change less over the life time (potentially more
in the limited set of cases with empirical relationships with little curvature). This is a problem
for the methodology as in TDDB and Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997), but it is not a problem
where entire age-earnings profiles of persons with the same age are compared (see Psacharopoulos
1994, for examples).
Another important aspect of this result is in what it says about estimates of the returns to
investment in human capital. Past research (following specifications by Mincer, 1974) has attempted
to measure the cost of investments at different periods of a worker’s career and estimated the returns
based on their increased earnings. The actual private returns to investment are the wage gains that
would occur with the effects of directed technology (and general improvements in productivity)
removed. Because the direction of technical bias is likely positively correlated with rates of human
capital accumulation, the results in this report suggest that this past research underestimates the
returns to investments in education or other skill acquisition late in life (and overestimates the value
early in life). Research comparing the lifetime earnings paths of similar workers that do and do not
invest does not face this problem (again see Psacharopoulos 1994, for examples) and could help to
measure the size of the curvature due to technology effects.
This research suggests an additional measurement error in past estimates of returns to
human capital investment. While researchers have rightly emphasized the importance of the social
costs and benefits of education (Psacharopoulos, 1994), those estimates often will not sufficiently
account for the external effect a worker has on the technology available to her cohort when she
invests in human capital.
These results have implications for broader issues in development. Much of growth liter-
ature has focused on the necessity of properly measuring the inputs to production. Klenow and
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997), for instance, attempt to show that better measurements of factors can
produce estimates of their roles in income growth and differences that are much higher than pre-
vious estimates. The results here show that proper accounting of post-schooling human capital
investments may be less important than it seems immediately. Although Mincer (1974) lauded “the
schooling model as a component of human capital analysis”, he claimed that “it is necessary to turn
to the post-school phase of investment behavior in order to extend the analysis to the whole earnings
distribution.” Here I have illustrated an alternative view: that schooling combined with technical
changes can explain a great deal of observed earnings distributions.
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This work also provides a guide for other researchers wishing to treat the theory of directed
technical change as a viable representation of wages and factor productivity for broad classes of
productive inputs, and I hope that I have inspired others to demand generality from this theory and
others.
58
Appendices
59
Appendix A
Model of directed technical change
using age groups and human
capital for elasticity of substitution
estimates
This section formalizes the solutions to the model presented in Chapter 1.
The model follows closely with Acemoglu (2002) except that I use the total human capital
provided to the market by a given age group as a productive input rather than using the quantity
of labor supplied by people of different levels of human capital. This would cause only negligible
differences in solving the model (but not in applications to the data) if we were to simply exchange
the two values wherever they occur (we could just stick an H wherever he has an L). However,
because we cannot observe wages per unit of human capital, I solve the model for the wage per
unit of labor. Thus the factor wages that concern us are not equivalent to those used by Acemoglu
(in terms of their role in determining technology). This specification is similar to the one used in
Chapter 2 with slight modifications to the innovation possibilities frontier (because here we do not
need to fit data for multiple countries).
60
A.1 Final Goods
Aggregate output Y is produced competitively with intermediate goods Ya specific to age
groups indexed by a according to 1
Y =
[∑
Y
−1

a
] 
−1
(A.1)
Final good output is the numeraire, so
∑
P 1−a = 1 (A.2)
The typical final good producer purchases intermediate goods at prices Pa and faces the
problem
max{Ya}
{
Y −
∑
PaYa
}
⇒ Pa
Pb
=
(
Ya
Yb
)− 1
(A.3)
where I have indicated a second age group with the subscript b. If we combine Equation
A.3 with a zero profit condition, we get that
Pa = Y Y
− 1
a
(∑
b
Y
−1

b
)−1
(A.4)
A.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced competitively using machines κa, labor La, and human
capital ha that are specific to the intermediate good:
Ya =
1
1− β (haLa)
β
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx (A.5)
1A more general version of this production function would seem to be one that allows for different weights on the
intermediate goods:
Y =
[∑
γaY
−1

a
] 
−1
However, these weights are not separately identified from the levels of production of the intermediate goods (which
are not observed) and the technology levels that lead to that production. Thus I normalize γa = 1 and allow the
production of intermediate goods to capture all aspects of the value of constituent markets in final good production.
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In this particular application, the labor types are age groups, so readers can think of these interme-
diate goods industries indexed by a as composite sets of services offered to the market by workers of
different ages. There is a continuum of length Xa of machine types indexed by x, representing the
level of technology in age group (sector) a, Ya sells at price Pa, machines of type x can be rented at
the price pa (x), and workers of age group a get paid wage wa. Thus the problem for the intermediate
good producer is
maxκ,L
[
Pa
1− β (haLa)
β
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx−
∫ Xa
0
pa (x)κa (x) dx− waLa
]
A.3 Demand for machines
Assuming that first order conditions hold with equality, the profit maximization condition
with respect to machines of for age group a is that
Pa (haLa)
β
κa (x)
−β
= pa (x)
The monopolist with the blueprint for a given line of machine produces and maintains each
unit of the machine with a unit of capital2 rented at price R. Thus the stock of capital is always equal
to the stock of machines. Each monopolist has a competitor who can produce the same machine at
cost υR, so the monopolist sets the limit price pa (x) = υR. The demand for a machine line for age
group a for a given capital rental rate is then
κa (x) =
(
Pa
υR
) 1
β
haLa (A.6)
which is independent of the type x of machine. Production of intermediate goods then takes the
form
Ya =
1
1− β
(
Pa
υR
) 1−β
β
XahaLa (A.7)
2This is like assuming that one unit of capital can produce one unit of machine per unit of time and then machines
depreciate fully but capital does not. The reader can think of machines as capital that has been temporarily repurposed
for a specific method of production.
62
Combined with equation A.3, this means that
Pa
Pb
=
(
XahaLa
XbhbLb
)− βσ
(A.8)
where σ = 1 + (− 1)β is (as I will show) the elasticity of substitution between worker age groups
conditional on fixed technology.
A.4 Monopoly profits for machine blueprint owners
The stream of profits per unit of κa is (υ − 1)R, so the stream of profits per machine
blueprint is
pia = (υ − 1)Rκa = υ − 1
υ
P
1
β
a haLa (υR)
β−1
β (A.9)
A.5 Demand for labor
The profit maximization condition with respect to labor is that
wa =
β
1− βPa (haLa)
β
L−1a
∫ Xa
0
κa (x)
1−β
dx
Combined with the condition for machines, this gives us that
wa =
β
1− βP
1
β
a (υR)
− 1−ββ Xaha (A.10)
which means that the relative wages are
wa
wb
=
Xa
Xb
(
Pa
Pb
) 1
β ha
hb
(A.11)
Combining A.11 with A.8 gives a specification for demand wages conditional on technology that
shows that the elasticity of substitution between worker age groups is σ:
wa
wb
=
(
Xaha
Xbhb
)σ−1
σ
(
La
Lb
)− 1σ
(A.12)
We could stop here if technology were observable, but one of the points of this paper is
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discuss the impact on estimates of σ from not observing X and failing to understand that implicit
in wage and labor supply data are changes in technology.
A.6 Allocation of capital
Because one unit of capital produces one machine and machine varieties are symmetric
industries within age groups, Ka (x) = κa (x), and the total capital used in an intermediate good
market is
Ka =
∫ Xa
0
κa (x) dx = Xaκa = Xa
(
Pa
υR
) 1
β
haLa (A.13)
Foregone consumption produces capital K, which is allocated between the intermediate
goods markets to produce machines. The relative capital allocations (using the relative prices already
derived) are
Ka
Kb
=
(
XahaLa
XbhbLb
)σ−1
σ
(A.14)
and we can use this relationship to back out the levels of technology allocated to age groups from
measures of the total capital.
A.7 Interest rates
In order to get the rental rate, we write the intermediate good output as
Ya =
1
1− βK
1−β
a (XahaLa)
β
(A.15)
and note that the marginal product of capital in this market is
MPKa = (1− β)Pa Ya
Ka
(A.16)
Capital market equilibrium requires that υR = MPKa, so
PaYa = RKa
υ
1− β (A.17)
The intermediate goods markets adjust so that there are zero profits in the final good market,
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so the sum of the five age-group-specific versions of Equation A.17 must equal Y , which requires
that
R =
1− β
υ
Y
K
(A.18)
The interest rate in this economy must be the rate that could be earned by producing
capital:
r = (1− τ)R− δ = (1− τ) 1− β
υ
Y
K
− δ (A.19)
where τ is the tax rate on capital income and δ is the rate of capital depreciation.
A.8 Consumption Demand
For simplicity, I assume a continuum of measure3 1 of infinitely-lived consumers with CRRA
preferences over a single consumption good over time. Consumers can borrow and lend at the interest
rate r. The representative consumer earns income equal to the aggregate output of final goods and
spends it on consumption C, investment in capital I, and research and development efforts R&D.
A.9 Technological innovation
I assume that a country builds its own stock of technology with R&D expenditures (foregone
consumption) with the following innovation possibilities frontier:
X˙a = ηaR&Da (A.20)
where
∑
aR&Da = R&D and ηa determines age-specific productivity of innovation. This follows the
“lab equipment” model (Romer, 1987; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991).
A.10 Characterizing the balanced growth path
Although the owners of machine blueprints produce their machines with some market power
once they have the blueprint, there is free entry into innovation. One unit of R&D expenditure
3The choice of size of the consumer base does not impact the results, because I am not trying to explain income (or
anything else) per consumer. This normalization is simply convenient for talking about a representative consumer.
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produces a stream of ηahL new blueprints, each with a present value Va, so as long as there are
positive R&D expenditures for every age group (as there would be along a BGP), free entry requires
1 = ηaVa (A.21)
and
Va
Vb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)−1
(A.22)
No arbitrage requires that
rVa = pia + V˙a (A.23)
In my applications, I deal only with the balanced growth path4. Along the BGP, V˙a = 0.
Using the value for instantaneous profits from Equation A.9, the BGP values of machine blueprints
must satisfy
Va =
pia
r
=
υ − 1
υr
P
1
β
a haLa (υR)
β−1
β (A.24)
and
Va
Vb
=
(
Pa
Pb
) 1
β haLa
hbLb
=
(
Xa
Xb
)− 1σ (haLa
hbLb
)σ−1
σ
using Equation A.8 to get the relative prices. Combining this with the equilibrium condition in A.22
gives a relationship between relative technology between age groups, relative frontier technology
between age groups, and relative productivity of innovation between age groups:
Xa
Xb
=
(
haLa
hbLb
)σ−1(
ηa
ηb
)σ
(A.25)
This gives us the endogenous technology values to put into Equation A.12 to get the long-run
relationship between wages and labor supplies:
wa
wb
=
(
ηa
ηb
)σ−1(
ha
hb
)σ−1(
La
Lb
)σ−2
(A.26)
4Although Acemoglu (2007) showed that off-BGP trends may be needed to match historical changes in skill premia
because the price effect dominates the short run and the market size effect often dominates in the long run, I do not
expect this to be a substantial weakness of my work. The reason is that when workers age, they are simply moving to
a different but established role in the economy rather than changing the expected distribution of workers across ages.
If there were instead a sudden, unexpected age demographic shock, then this could cause problems for my analysis.
The baby boom is one potential shock, but innovators had over an entire decade to prepare for this shock (average
fertility rates are not private information). Other potential shocks are wars, which may differentially kill young, male
workers) and diseases, which often differentially kill older workers).
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Appendix B
Effect of σ on wage curvature
Past researchers have emphasized the importance of the elasticity of substitution between
worker types in fitting the data. For instance, Jerzmanowski and Tamura (2015) find that low values
of σ induce the United States to appear to be a high-barrier nation. However, TDDB’s strategy for
constructing human capital includes intergenerational transfers of skills—if one generation is skilled,
then the next one can borrow from the skills of the older generation. This reduces the apparent
importance of schooling in generating human capital and allows the US and other wealthy nations
to possess relatively high levels of human capital and low barriers despite having similar levels of
schooling to lower income countries. This fact means that the model reduces the importance of this
robustness issue from past work.
As argued earlier, elasticities of substitution are essential for determining the strength of
bias in technical development and thus the distribution of technologies. I estimate kernel density
functions for technologies relative to the US for each input type in the year 2010, and Figure B.1
shows how changes in the value of σ affect the calculated distribution of technologies.
The first thing to notice is that within the reasonable range for σ (2–3) the densities do not
change much. We do see some changes in specialization of technology. For instance, the US has
an older population than much of the rest of the world, so technologies relative to the US for older
workers fall as σ increases, whereas technologies relative to the US for the youngest workers rise as
σ increases. However, only when going from very small values to very large values of σ do we easily
see this effect.
The graphs suggest that the position of the US in the distribution does not change much in
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response to the elasticity of substitution (except for with the younger workers, in which the US is not
relatively abundant), in contradiction with past research. Table B.1 quantifies this fact by showing
the technology percentiles for the US for each level of σ for the last 60 years. The framework fits
intuition that the US is a high-productivity country (for middle-aged and older workers) without
requiring dubious assumptions about the elasticity of substitution.
It is useful to note that the US may show up as a lower-productivity country than expected
simply because of an omission from the production function: natural resources. The data sample
includes countries that are primarily commodity exporters or otherwise have a very small set of
industries that rely on very specific inputs. For instance, Jordan (an oil exporter) and The Bahamas
(mainly a tourism and banking producer) both appear to be highly productive countries in this
analysis. It seems silly to base results off of small economies with unusual circumstances. Removing
countries whose economies are more than 20% oil production and some island countries with large
tourism industries moves the US higher in the technology distribution and shrinks the changes from
σ = 2 to σ = 3 in Table B.1 so that they are almost always less than 3%.
Tables B.2 through B.4 show estimates for the average wage curvature within cohorts for
values of the elasticity of substitution (σ) of 1.7, 3, and 6. There is significant wage concavity even
in the weak bias case in Table B.2 where σ = 1.7. The high elasticity case (where σ = 6 in Table
B.4) produces a much smaller upward trend in wages in the early career, but the reader should recall
that the main point of the paper is to look at wage concavity rather than to explain why wages rise
over time.
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Figure B.1: How σ affects technologies relative to the US in 2010
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σ = 1.7 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 6
1950 0.785 0.765 0.698 0.544
1960 0.596 0.550 0.503 0.417
1970 0.576 0.558 0.564 0.612
1980 0.518 0.488 0.404 0.343
1990 0.470 0.429 0.274 0.149
2000 0.647 0.593 0.461 0.365
2010 0.629 0.587 0.443 0.431
(a) Ages 15–24
σ = 1.7 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 6
1950 0.839 0.839 0.852 0.899
1960 0.689 0.702 0.728 0.795
1970 0.558 0.533 0.527 0.515
1980 0.608 0.627 0.735 0.898
1990 0.702 0.714 0.804 0.946
2000 0.707 0.695 0.725 0.790
2010 0.719 0.719 0.701 0.754
(b) Ages 25–34
σ = 1.7 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 6
1950 0.866 0.886 0.919 0.966
1960 0.788 0.821 0.921 0.980
1970 0.655 0.673 0.733 0.848
1980 0.608 0.608 0.645 0.747
1990 0.750 0.780 0.899 0.970
2000 0.850 0.886 0.946 0.988
2010 0.850 0.886 0.946 0.976
(c) Ages 35–44
σ = 1.7 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 6
1950 0.832 0.839 0.886 0.906
1960 0.715 0.768 0.848 0.927
1970 0.715 0.733 0.818 0.909
1980 0.693 0.723 0.801 0.886
1990 0.726 0.774 0.887 0.917
2000 0.850 0.892 0.964 0.982
2010 0.808 0.862 0.928 0.940
(d) Ages 45–54
σ = 1.7 σ = 2 σ = 3 σ = 6
1950 0.846 0.846 0.832 0.832
1960 0.722 0.762 0.815 0.801
1970 0.721 0.764 0.842 0.873
1980 0.747 0.801 0.861 0.916
1990 0.857 0.905 0.923 0.940
2000 0.808 0.832 0.868 0.844
2010 0.826 0.850 0.880 0.862
(e) Ages 55–64
Table B.1: US’ technology percentiles for various values of σ
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Table B.2: Wage-experience regression results (σ = 1.7)
Log of Yearly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decades of Experience 0.640∗∗∗ −0.822∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗
(0.009) (0.282) (0.010) (0.213)
Decades of Experience2 −0.050∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Capital per worker 0.633∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Wage maximizing exp (dec.) 6.36 −6.47 8.1 −8.95
Year FE No Y es No Y es
Cohort×Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 9,889 9,889 9,889 9,889
R2 0.768 0.252 0.861 0.573
Adjusted R2 0.562 0.184 0.630 0.418
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table B.3: Wage-experience regression results (σ = 3)
Log of Yearly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decades of Experience 0.464∗∗∗ −0.798∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.292
(0.016) (0.470) (0.008) (0.237)
Decades of Experience2 −0.044∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Capital per worker 0.904∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Wage maximizing exp (dec.) 5.25 −5.39 2.03 −13.44
Year FE No Y es No Y es
Cohort×Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 9,889 9,889 9,889 9,889
R2 0.287 0.141 0.826 0.782
Adjusted R2 0.210 0.103 0.605 0.570
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.4: Wage-experience regression results (σ = 6)
Log of Yearly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decades of Experience 0.021 −1.354 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.202
(0.048) (1.502) (0.008) (0.251)
Decades of Experience2 −0.029∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Capital per worker 1.004∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage maximizing exp (dec.) 0.36 −6.37 3.4 124.98
Year FE No Y es No Y es
Cohort×Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 9,889 9,889 9,889 9,889
R2 0.032 0.032 0.973 0.973
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.023 0.712 0.710
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
72
Appendix C
An alternative measure of barriers
The functional form chosen for the barriers in Chapter 2 might seem unnecessarily compli-
cated to some readers, because there are two separate parameters that both jointly determine the
shape of the innovation frontier. Here I consider a simpler alternative and find that it does a poor
job of matching observed wages, whereas the version used in the main paper precisely matches wages
in the US by construction.
Although Jerzmanowski and Tamura (2015) need η to help fit observed skill premia, we
might think that the cost of developing technologies for 25–34-year-olds is more similar to the cost
of developing technologies for 35–44-year-olds than the cost of technology for low-skilled workers is
to the cost of technology for highly-skilled workers. In other words, age groups may differentiate
workers less than their education or other skills do. If this is true, including η in the analysis may
obscure the results by inducing unnecessary uncertainty over other parameters.
This appendix considers the case where ηa = ηb = 1 for all age groups a and b. In the
main analysis, ηs were fit to wages in the United States and then used to produce wages elsewhere.
Without including η, we can produce wage estimates and then see if they match those observed in
the US.
The solution algorithm is essentially the same as before except that I omit step 3 because
Equation 28 in the main paper already gives the relative technologies in terms of the frontier tech-
nologies.
Figure C.1 compares the relative wages produced with this methodology against the relative
wages constructed from the US Census. In each case, there is a strong negative correlation between
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the two series. This framework does not do a good job of reproducing actual wage patterns, so I
abandon it.
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Figure C.1: Time series of wages from the US Census and constructed assuming η = 1.
Table C.1 estimates Equation 2.34 based on wages calculated assuming that ηa = ηb = 1
for all age groups a and b. Removing these age-specific productivity measures eliminates most of
the upward trend in wages (other than whatever is captured by year fixed effects).
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Table C.1: Wage-experience regression results (η = 1)
Log of Yearly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decades of Experience 0.062∗∗∗ −1.605∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.815∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.274) (0.007) (0.210)
Decades of Experience2 0.025∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Capital per worker 0.570∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Wage maximizing exp (dec.) −1.24 43.8 0.47 42.07
Year FE No Y es No Y es
Cohort×Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 9,889 9,889 9,889 9,889
R2 0.626 0.032 0.762 0.433
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.023 0.557 0.316
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Appendix D
Life-cycle wage patterns for all
countries
This section presents results for solutions for wages for every cohort born before 1990 in
every country. The legend below indicates the approximate birth year for each cohort. There is a
lot of information to communicate in a small space, so it can be difficult to pair the lines with birth
years. The cohorts born later are typically in the upper left of each plot.
Cohort born in
1800
1810
1820
1830
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1850
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1870
1880
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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Figure D.1: Predicted wage for each cohort throughout their lifetimes as they gain experience (every
country)
Note: More recent cohorts are typically higher and to the left
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